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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHANNAN S. SINGH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900497-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant CHANNAN S. SINGH relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant 
replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of the involved authority requires a 
"writing," which was (purportedly) issued by the government. The 
involved police officers testified that the papers seized from 
Mr. Singh were invalid and could not be used. The papers, 
themselves, further evidenced their facial invalidity and did not 
satisfy the requisite elements of the forgery statute. 
Failure to adhere to the statutory requirements cannot be 
circumvented by the alleged intent of the Model Penal Code. The 
State has not shown that the Utah legislature considered or adopted 
the "MPC," and even it the MPC was adopted, the MPC would still 
require an apparently complete writing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A "WRITING," 
fPURPORTEDLY) ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State contends that Mr. Singh "provides 
no authority or argument indicating that section 76-6-501 codifies 
the common law as to 'legal efficacy.'" Appellee's brief at 9. The 
State misreads Mr. Singh's brief wherein his statutory argument1 
stated, inter alia: 
Utah's Code may not explicitly list the common law 
element of "legal efficacy" in its forgery statute, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, but the forgery charges 
nonetheless require the "writing" to symbolize a right 
or privilege issued by the government. Id. No 
privilege attaches to an invalid license. 
Appellant's opening brief at 9. 
A statutory analysis is the appropriate starting point for 
this appeal. See Appellant's opening brief, Point I. "A 
fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous 
language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to 
1
 The caselaw authority cited by Appellant, State v. 
Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988), is also applicable. The State's 
reading of Ortega, that "[t]he case clearly stands for the 
proposition that a public document must purport to have legal 
efficacy in order to constitute a forgery . . . [and that] the 
documents at issue were completely blank driver's license forms, 
obviously lacking even the semblance of apparent legal 
efficacy, . . . " Appellee's brief at 9, is directly supportive of 
Appellant's arguments. See Appellant's opening brief at 8 n.3 and 
accompanying text. 
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BdL-. Il ii in J ii! 11 11I in I HUM The S t a t e d o e s not il.i-.pute t h e 
nl.iiiri l a n g u a g e of t h e app l j c a b l e s t a t u t e s or t h e I n v o l v e d d r i v e r ' s 
p e r m i t . 
Instead, I lie1 .state argues, " ftlhe Model Penal rode strongly 
suggests that the* making of an incomplete document, in appropriate 
c i r c u m s t a m n e r , i i u i." * I i I 111 i' >. I i n i q e r y 11| n<1 I < »< < " \, 111 i < • 1 111 I I \ I t p r 
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commentarJ i ., See A p p e l l e e ' s b r i e f a t 11-17 , While i t may be t r u e 
t h a t U t a h ' s f o r g e r y s t a t u t e conta in*! so'iimo l anguage ICJPIII I r*a I i I lie 
inli tniii|i i '|. i • r \ mi I-1 , I lie S t a t e ' s r e l i a n c e on t h e 
"MPC , s p l a c e d i n a t l€MKt t h r e e ma |ox i n s p e c t s . 
I1 i.;f , AS a l l u d e d t o abr1 i "v.'ii n> .*if ,i.f { I1.1 . | u 11»j« • 
r'1^"** I". i M M , I , • M I I ,l I ' J I l o o t e d L1, i bbui t tt tin* l e g i s l a t i v e 
h i s t c y» J o h n s o n . 770 P. 2d a t 9'", f v m s t r u i n g Kuehner v . I r v i n g 
Trust Co. , "»QQ n V Ml-> M ( I O V M \ i
 MM>i ,<ji I 
i • f ihii U I H requires a writing t-ii appeal (or actually b* 
governmental ly issued "riqht privilege, or identification - ih 
C - - i - ' n n h h Y f W • S O I mi i I l ! mi ,n i I  I I ill m l m i \ \h 1 n i I a 
" l n en,.!1' unambiguously icleis In 11, .is ii "privilege issued under 
[the Operators' M c e n ^ Art I In operate « mnt-nr vehicle. Utah Code 
Ann ' 1 1 - ? I fi;1 ml I I) i d d e d ) Il nspicuously displayed 
disclaimer on each driver's permit states, "Not Valid Without 
Licensee's Signature." See State's Exhibit's I j Il II i 
express language of the applicable authorities reveals that a forged 
governmental writing would not include a permit, inadequately 
completed and unrepresentative of a privilege, resort to the forgery 
statute's legislative history is unnecessary. 
Second, the State cites no authority to support its 
contention that when Utah adopted the wording of the New Hampshire 
forgery statute, it also adopted "whole-cloth" the intent of the 
Model Penal Code commentaries, at least in terms of the forgery 
section. See Appellee's brief at 11. Unstated by the State is 
whether the Utah or New Hampshire legislature even considered, let 
alone adopted, the intent of the MPC during the drafting of their 
respective forgery provisions. Indeed, the State provides no 
explanation of why the Utah legislature made minor changes in the 
wording of its statute and the significance of those changes, if 
any, assuming that Utah did in fact intend to adopt both the 
language and the commentaries from the MPC section in their 
entirety. The State's unsupported assumptions should not be 
considered on appeal. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam). 
Third, even if the State's reliance on the Model Penal Code 
is tenable, the MPC's emphasis on the actor's mental state still 
does not negate the existence of the "facially complete" writing 
requirement. See Appellant's opening brief at 8 n.3. The "writing" 
requirement, a key element of the alleged offense, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(2), cannot be considered "non-material." Appellee's 
brief at 16. 
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that the writing is complete enough to appear authentic e 
Appe 11 ee * n brief m t 1 7 111 i i » m n i t » 1 1 m 11 in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 m i i« i n i 1 1 1 1 J t ' i i i 11 iiiiiii < v i i i n g 
ii njiii ,'.nnpletod, seemingly vaJ nl "writing11 to ci buyer, who, in 
turn, knows of its falsity Hit still passes it oft as anther1 • ' 
t h i r d p a r t > , Tl"n iiiiii i mini 1 t-iiidii I m i m i l h » I I i i i I i i i • i i I I n 
""wi it ijiiui • nil uracil to make it appear valid.*' The fraudulent scheme 
can be executed at the outset without any additional I t\\-
"completit ii " 
The situation is different, however, «l.i .i «iii. individual 
sells a pj^ee of papor which is so I nek MKI i « ml mill \ ii.il • i 
invest i«ifi1 IIIIIII in i in»i *i IJIIMII I I i ii i n m i me partially completed forms 
were not useable as temporary pei «ii!' "|' | | "1" f»H, n M , M n c e 
the government would not issue such nh i kriHr>i ^Uit 1H n-L I y < v . n i | l..'l*' I 
<" In its brief, the State argues that additional steps ot 
completion may not be reguired for a forgery charge to exist 
Appellee's brief at 9. Its argument, however, is taken out of 
context. The general rule is that "[t]here can be no forgery of an 
instrument which is void on its face, as in the case of a 
meaningless paper, [or] an instrument so incomplete as obviously to 
be incapable of enforcement, . . ." 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal 
Law § 512 (14th ed• 1981) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 
The State's relied upon exception, inapplicable here, 
involves an instrument which is already complete enough to evidence 
its apparent legal efficacy. See Hall v. State, 31 Ala. App. 455, 
18 So.2d 572 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) ("had the forged bond been void 
without legal efficacy on its face, the demurrers would have been 
well taken, but . . . the bail bond was as legally efficacious 
unsigned by the defendant as signed, , " ) ; Clay v. State, 57 Ala. 
App. 630, 330 So.2d 453 (Ala. Crim. App, 1975) (the instrument was 
already "in proper form" and it "was nor void because the account 
number on the instrument was absent"). 
"writing," a middleman must first complete the blank spaces before 
passing it off as authentic to a third party. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 10 n.4 and accompanying text. No writing or 
forgery existed. 
The State's heavy reliance on the "strong suggestions" of 
the MPC overlooked the unproven statutory elements of a "writing," 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2), which was (purportedly) issued by the 
"government." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(a). Despite the State's 
reference to decisions "whereby conceivably non-culpable conduct was 
found to be within the statute's purview," Appellee's brief at 13, 
courts have consistently recognized that perceptions of "guilt" are 
an inadequate substitute for proving each element of the offense. 
See Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) ("in a 
criminal prosecution every element of the offense must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt"); cf. State v. Sampson. 156 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 8 n.8 (Utah App. 1991) (opinion on rehearing) ("we 
are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional safeguards to 
assuage the frustrations that inhere in retrying a defendant clearly 
guilty of such a heinous crime"). 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE FACIALLY VOID PERMITS 
PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ACQUITTAL 
(Reply to Point II-IV of Appellee's Brief) 
The State contends, "[o]ther than eliciting from the 
State's witnesses [testimony] that the permits were void as sold to 
police detectives, defendant offered no evidence at all to refute 
- 6 
the State's case." Appellee's brief at 19 (emphasis added). This 
key segment of cross-examination, however, cannot be overlooked. 
(R 32); (T 68, 79). 
Obtaining this acknowledgement of "voidness" provided the 
jury with a rational basis for acquitting Mr. Singh of forgery. See 
also State's Exhibits 1-3 (the permits are facially invalid). "[I]n 
determining whether a rational jury could acquit on the greater 
charge and find guilt on the lesser charge, the court must view the 
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the defendant." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 
451 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); State v. 
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have 
accepted the defendant's testimony concerning a lesser included 
offense, "however unlikely that might have been," it was error to 
refuse the instruction). For the reasons stated previously in his 
opening brief, Mr. Singh submits that the trial court erred in 
refusing to charge the jury with the lesser included offenses.3 See 
Appellant's opening brief, Point II. 
Mr. Singh also continues to maintain, as did the trial 
court below, that the State "could have charged [him] under [Utah 
3
 The State requests that this Court to enter a "judgment 
of conviction for attempted forgery[,]" Appellee's brief at 22-23, a 
lesser included offense of the alleged offense. The statutory 
authority cited by the State, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), permits 
such an entry only "if such relief is sought by the defendant." 
Id. In contrast to the State's request, Mr. Singh seeks a reversal 
"because there was insufficient evidence to support the forgery 
charges or [a reversal] and remand for a new trial with the addition 
of his proposed jury instructions." Appellant's opening brief at 20. 
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Code Ann. § 41-2-133." (T 18); see Appellant's opening brief at 16, 
19 n.7 and accompanying text. The State's reference to a "transfer" 
presupposes a transfer of a sufficiently completed writing issued by 
the government. Appellee's brief at 21-22. The prohibited use of a 
license statute would not necessarily require a transfer and was 
more specifically tailored for th€> involved conduct than the forgery 
statute. See Appellant's opening brief at 19 n.7. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Channan Singh 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. See 
Appellant's reply brief at 7 n.3. 
SUBMITTED this 32- day of April, 1990. 
UiP^ 
Attorney for, De^fidant/Appellant 
RONALD S.^FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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